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Abstract 
With the increasing profit orientation of German airport operators the question as to whether 
they possess market power is gaining more importance. Whereas there have been some 
studies about the degree of market power of individual airports in countries such as Australia 
and Great Britain, the German airport market has not yet been studied in detail. This paper is 
part of a research project that tries to assess market power in this market. It indicates which of 
the 35 examined German airports possess market power and therefore need special regulatory 
attendance. We calculate a substitution coefficient for inter-airport competition that quantifies 
the quality of the best substitute for a certain airport. It is defined as the proportion of 
inhabitants within the relevant regional market of an airport that consider another airport, 
which has been identified as meeting the demands of the airlines, to be a good substitute from 
their perspective as well. The analysis is complemented by an assessment of intermodal 
substitution and countervailing power of airlines. The study gives strong indication that 23 out 
of the 35 German airports do not possess relevant market power. In contrast to this, four 
airports (HAM, FRA, MUC, STR) and Berlin Airport System (THF, TXL, SXF) have strong, 
five (BRE, DRS, LEJ, NUE, HAJ) have modest market power. These results provide a basis 
for the construction of an efficient regulatory framework for the German airport market. 
 
Keywords: airport competition, countervailing power, market power, substitution 
JEL codes:  
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 I. Introduction  
German airports were long regarded as passive providers of infrastructure without any interest 
in generating profits, whose sole purpose should be the provision of capacity for the 
functioning of the air transport market. During the last decade, however, airports have started 
perceiving themselves as enterprises competing with other sites for passengers and airlines. 
This increasing profit orientation can be attributed to three major developments: First, and 
most important, there has been a change of governance structure at many German airports: 
Although being organized as private companies for decades (contrary to other German 
transport infrastructure providers that were structured as public agencies), its shareholders 
were all public entities such as the federal or state government, public companies or 
municipalities. This has changed significantly: Of the 35 airports in Germany offering 
scheduled or holiday charter flights in 2004, now already ten are at least partially owned by 
private investors (Table 1 on the next page) and there are plans to open three more airports 
(Lübeck, Munich and Cologne) to private capital.
1 In 2005, more than 50 % of all passengers 
in Germany started or ended their journey at an airport with private capital involvement. This 
figure will rise to about 75 % if the federal government sells their stakes in Munich and 
Cologne.  
Second, severe public budget problems lead to more cost and profit awareness of public 
shareholders, who strive for some return on their investment in the airport or at least expect 
the airport operator to minimize financial losses. 
Third, the liberalization of the downstream airline market has led to a change of the business 
environment of the airport from ‘mutual existence’ with airlines to confrontation on service 
quality and prices. Airport managers suddenly have to deal with airlines pressing for lower 
charges and better quality and threatening to switch to another airport, thus ‘forcing’ airports 
into competition. 
                                                 
1    See Siegmund (2004), p. 72, Moring/Zamponi (2005), p. 22 and Handelsblatt (2004), p. 4.   - 4 -
Table 1: Ownership structure of privatised German airports 





County Altenburger Land 
Stadtwerke Altenburg GmbH 
Municipality of Nobitz 
Altenburger Destillerie und  
Liqueurfabrik GmbH 
Altenburger Brauerei GmbH 
Wellpappenwerk Luck GmbH 




















Flughafen Dusseldorf GmbH 
Stadtwerke Mönchengladbach GmbH 









Federal state of Rhineland-Palatinate 




Frankfurt/Main (FRA)  Flughafen Frankfurt/Main AG 
(Fraport AG) 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Federal state of Hesse  











City of Friedrichshafen  
Luftschiffbau-Zeppelin GmbH 
ZF Friedrichshafen AG 








Hamburg (HAM)  Flughafen Hamburg GmbH  City of Hamburg  









City of Hanover 




Niederrhein (NRN)  Flughafen Niederrhein GmbH  Airport Niederrhein Holding GmbH 
d) 
County Kleve 















 Private companies are underlined; a) Airport Partners GmbH: Hochtief AirPort GmbH 60 %, Aer Rianta 
PLC (Dublin Airport Authority PLC) 40 %, b) Hamburg Airport Partners GmbH & Co KG: Hochtief AirPort 
GmbH 53 %, Hochtief Airport Capital 27 % Aer Rianta PLC (Dublin Airport Authority PLC) 20 %
c) Sole 
shareholder: Federal state of Lower Saxony, 
d) Sole shareholder: Airport Network BV,
 e) Sole shareholder: 
Federal state of Saarland. 
Source: Own compilation based on airport operators’ reports and publications by shareholders. 
 
With increasing profit orientation of German airports the question as to whether airports in 
Germany possess market power and therefore need to be regulated is gaining more 
importance. In essence an airport with market power is able to restrict the amount supplied 
and to raise the price in order to increase its profits at the expense of consumers; with the 
result that social surplus is reduced. Even if the airport can discriminate in pricing and thus   - 5 -
charges the marginal consumer prices equal to marginal costs – so that there is no shortage of 
supply compared to the competitive level – overall social surplus might be lower because of 
inefficient operations and higher marginal costs than in a competitive environment. The 
airport could also seek to reduce quality below consumers’ preferences in order to increase its 
profits.  
Whereas there have been some studies about the degree of market power of individual 
airports in countries such as Australia and Great Britain, the German airport market has not 
yet been studied in detail.
2 Most German research has focused on optimizing the regulatory 
framework, taking more or less as given the existence of market power. This paper is part of a 
research project that makes a contribution to filling this gap. It indicates which of the 
examined German airports possess market power and therefore need special regulatory 
attendance. The results can be used as a basis for designing an efficient regulatory framework 
for the German airport market. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section II provides a closer look at the research question 
and the research subject. This is followed by a detailed assessment of the market power of 
German airports (section III), in which we take into account not only intramodal and 
intermodal competitive constraints on the market conduct of airports but also countervailing 
power of airlines. Section IV contains onclusions. 
 
II. Definition of the research question and the research subject 
Airports provide a series of services for their customers: 
•  Aeronautical services (e.g. infrastructure provision, rescue, security, fire-fighting, 
runway and taxiway maintenance) 
•  Aeronautical-related commercial services (e.g. baggage, passenger and cargo 
handling, catering, supply of fuel and lubricants, waste disposal) 
•  Non-aviation services (e.g. retailing, car rental, banks, hotels, restaurants) 
Aeronautical and aeronautical-related commercial services are often called ‘aviation services’ 
to emphasize their core role for the functioning of the air transport market and differentiate 
them from additional services not needed for facilitating air traffic (non-aviation services). 
                                                 
2     See e.g. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2001) and Productivity Commission (2002) 
for Australian airports, Commerce Commission (2002) for New Zealand, Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission (1987) and Competition Commission (2002) for Great Britain.    - 6 -
The paper focuses on market power in aviation services as non-aviation services of an airport 
are generally regarded as being subject to competition from inner-city leasing or retailing.
3  
Moreover, we concentrate on market power in enabling passenger transportation. This is 
mainly due to the reason that the market for providing aviation services for cargo-only flights 
and the cargo market itself are unanimously regarded by the relevant literature as being highly 
competitive, contrary to the passenger market.
4 
Because of prohibitively high entry barriers in the German airport market (mainly due to legal 
and administrative restrictions), competitive constraints can only derive from current 
substitutes.
5 Therefore we do not further analyse potential competition but only current.  
Another restriction concerning the research subject deals with the character of passenger 
traffic at the airport: We exclusively look at market power of German airports with scheduled 
or holiday charter traffic. Market power of airports that are only used for general aviation is 
not analysed, because it is generally perceived as being non-existent due to the high number 
of airports (>100) that are able to provide the services needed for this segment of the aviation 
market.
6  
Figure 1 shows the spatial distribution, the size – measured in weekly departures – and the 
ownership structure of the 35 airports in Germany with scheduled and holiday charter traffic 
in summer 2004. Quite a lot of these airports do not operate independently but are part of 
airport groups with overlapping shareholder structures. As members of airport groups do not 
compete with each other, they do not mitigate potential market power of their partners. We 
will include this aspect in our analysis of market power later on. 
 
                                                 
3    See Productivity Commission (2002), p. 177 and Brunekreeft/Neuscheler (2003), p. 270. 
4    See e.g. Gillen/Henriksson/Morrison (2001), p. 47; Tretheway (2001), p. 39. 
5    See Malina (2005), p. 132 ff. for a detailed discussion of entry barriers. 
6    See Reuss (2003), p. 545 ff.   - 7 -
Figure 1: Spatial distribution, size and ownership structure of the German airport market 
 
 
III. Assessment of the market power of German airports 
1. Introduction to the approach 
The standard approach for assessing market power is a two-stage procedure, consisting of the 
definition of the relevant market followed by an analysis of market power within the relevant 
market. 
There are various competing methods for defining the relevant market. Probably most 
common is the concept of close substitutability, in which the relevant market can be described 
as “a group of sellers of close-substitute outputs who supply a common group of buyers”
 7. 
Close substitutability of the output of different suppliers is a result of the fact, „that they are 
all varieties of the same sort of good or service … with similarity in form or function and 
fulfilling the same sort of specific want or need of buyers“
8.  
When we transfer this definition to the airport market, a close substitute of an airport can be 
every supplier that is able to satisfy the needs of the customers of aviation-services 
                                                 
7    Bain (1959), p. 6. 
8    Bain (1959), p. 211 f.   - 8 -
(passengers and airlines) as well as the currently used airport. Such suppliers can of course be 
other airports (intramodal substitutability), but also other means of transportation such as road 
and rail (intermodal substitutability) or even firms from other economic sectors (intersectoral 
substitutability) such as IT-companies that offer video-conferencing. However, as studies 
show that intersectoral substitution of air transportation is very low, we refrain from analyzing 
this point any further.
9 
Once the relevant market has been defined, different approaches exist for identifying market 
power.
 10  
We develop a concentration ratio that accounts for different buyer preferences in the 
intramodal analysis. We call this ratio ‘substitution coefficient’. It quantifies the quality of the 
best substitute for a certain airport. The substitution coefficient is defined as the share of 
inhabitants within the relevant regional market of an airport that consider another airport, 
which has been identified as meeting the demands of the airlines, to be a good substitute from 
their perspective as well. 
A low substitution coefficient, however, is not sufficient for identifying market power, 
because it disregards potential countervailing power of airlines and intermodal constraints on 
the conduct of the airport. Therefore, we also take a closer look at the degree of intermodal 
competition from surface transport modes and the degree of countervailing power at the 
airports. 
 
2. Intramodal Analysis 
We look at airport substitutability from the position of an airline as the direct customer of 
aeronautical services. The question we try to answer is: What requirements does an airport 
have to meet in order to be considered by the airline as a good substitute for a currently used 
airport? 
One can differentiate between three types of demands: Customer oriented demands are 
requisitions derived from the determinants of airport choice of passengers. An air carrier is 
only able to profitably switch flights to another airport if this airport is accepted by 
passengers. A potential substitute has to meet infrastructural demands as well: In order to be 
                                                 
9     See Hughes (1995); Stephenson/Bender (1996); Elsasser/ Rangosch- du Moulin (1997); Mason (2002), 
Denstadli (2004). 
10   See e.g. Lerner (1934), Bain (1941), p. 272 ff.; Herfindahl (1950).   - 9 -
regarded as a good alternative the airport must be capable of providing the necessary services 
for the type of air traffic the airline operates at the currently used airport. Third, an alternative 
airport has to meet the necessary legal requirements for enabling the kind of air traffic that the 
airline operates at the current airport. We look at these demands in detail below.
11  
 
2.1. Customer oriented demands of an airline 
Much econometrical work has been done on the determinants of passengers’ airport choice. 
Starting with Kanafani et al. in 1975 numerous studies from various countries have been able 
to show that airport choice is influenced by mainly four factors:
12  
•  Flight availability: Is there a flight from airport A to destination B?  
•  Flight frequency: How often can destination B be reached by flights departing from 
A? 
•  Ticket price: How much does it cost to fly from A to B? 
•  Access Time: How long does it take to get to airport A? 
Obviously, the first factor is a precondition for an airport to be shortlisted and thus is equally 
important for all customer segments. Kanafani et al. (1975), Ashford/Benchemann (1987), 
Harvey (1987), Windle/Dresner (1975), Pels et al. (2000) and recently Hess/Polak (2003) 
could show, however, that the importance of the other three determinants differs significantly 
between business and leisure travellers (tourists and ‘visiting friends and relatives’). Whereas 
frequency of flights and access time are the most important factors in the utility function of a 
business traveller (the more flights and the shorter the access time the higher the utility of 
airport usage), leisure travellers’ utility is influenced most strongly by ticket prices (the 
cheaper the ticket the higher the utility of airport usage). These findings are consistent with 
estimations of own price elasticity of business and leisure travel demand, which show that the 
own price elasticity of business travellers is much higher than of leisure travellers.
13 The 
results are also supported by passenger surveys on various German airports, that show that 
                                                 
11   We do not look at prices as a factor of airport choice mainly due to two reasons: First we assume that 
airports are able to successfully discriminate in prices between new and old customers. This means that 
airlines which are willing to shift to another airport can be offered competitive prices. Second, as economies 
of scale of airport operations are generally perceived to flatten out around 5 million Work Load Units a 
year, airports can reach a competitive overall cost structure by making airline switch operations to them.  
12   See e.g. Kanafani et al. (1975); Harvey (1987); Ashford/Bencheman (1987); Windle/Dresner (1995); Cohas 
et al. (1995); Mandel (1999a) and (1999b), Pels et al. (2000) and (2003), Moreno/Mueller (2003); 
Hess/Polak (2003).   - 10 -
airports with a high percentage of leisure travellers have a larger catchment area c.p. than 
airports where business travel is more important.
14 These surveys also indicate that customers 
of low-cost-carriers are even more price and less time sensitive than the average leisure 
traveller.  
Ticket prices, flight availability and flight frequency, however, are endogenous for an airline 
because it is the airline that sets prices, defines its network and the flight frequency. Only 
access time is an exogenous factor that cannot be influenced by an air carrier. Thus, an airline, 
looking for an alternative to the currently used airport has to check very carefully if access 
time to the new airport is adequate for its customers.  
 
2.2. Infrastructural demands  
The airport infrastructure mainly consists of a runway system and facilities for processing 
passengers or freight. The dominant factor that decides if a carrier is able to shift flights to a 
new airport is the runway system. Depending on the type of aircraft and the intensity of usage, 
the requirements of an airline regarding the configuration of the runway differ significantly 
both qualitatively and quantitatively: If an aircraft is heavier, the runway has to be longer and 
must be able to stand more load (qualitative dimension). If an airline wants to shift a flight to 
a new airport, this airport must have the capacity to process this flight (quantitative 
dimension). 
The ‘ACN/PCN system’ (short for aircraft classification number / pavement classification 
number) indicates if an aircraft is suitable for regular takeoffs or landings on a specific 
runway without damaging the runway more than what has been defined as being normal. 
Basically, an ACN value is assigned to every type of aircraft depending on the load it exerts 
on the runway. This value is compared with the PCN of the runway, which shows its strength. 
If the ACN is lower than the PCN, the aircraft is suitable for regular usage of the runway.
15 In 
general the ACN of an aircraft rises with its weight.
16 The same is true for the required take-
off (TODR) and landing distance (LDR). TODR and LDR, however, are also influenced by 
                                                                                                                                                          
13   See Gillen/Morrisson/Stewart (2003) for a comprehensive survey. 
14   See Klophaus (2004); Valentinelli et al. (2004). 
15   See The Boeing Company (1998) for a more accurate and detailed description of ACN and PCN. 
16   See annex 1 for ACN values of selected aircrafts.    - 11 -
external factors such as runway elevation and weather conditions.
17 As LDR is always shorter 
than TODR, the required take-off length is the limiting factor of runway usage.  
The following table shows the TODR of six different aircraft types from wide-body aircraft to 
a 50-seater regional aircraft.
18 As starting aircraft often do not reach their maximum take-
weight (due to, e.g., shorter flight length than possible and thus less fuel) we also display 
TODR with ¾ load capacity. The table indicates that even for regional aircraft 1,000 metre is 
the minimum required runway length. 
 
Table 2: Take-off distance required for various aircraft with MTOW and 3/4 load capacity 
TODR in metr 
Aircraft 
MTOW  ¾ load capacity 
B 747-400   3,488 2,616
B 767-300 ER   3,188 2,000
B 757-300   2,780 1,962
B 737-800   2,523 1,853
B 737-500  1,655 1,363
ATR 42-500  1,165 990
   Notes: TODR is calculated in the following conditions: dry and even runway at sea level, 24° C., no wind.  
   Source: Own calculations based on information from aircraft manufacturers. 
 
As required runway strength and length are quite similar for some aircraft types we can 
categorize aircraft regarding the necessary configuration of the runway starting with category 
6 for regional aircraft such as ATR 42/72, Bae 146 and going up to category 1 for wide-body 
aircraft such as B 747 or A 340.
19 
Apart from runway strength and length, the quality of landing aids at the airport is also 
important for airport choice: In order to operate reliable regular air transport an airport has to 
be equipped with an instrument landing system (ILS) that enables precision approaches under 
bad visibility. Depending on the quality of the system, ILS can be divided into three main 
categories starting with Cat. I. (allowing landings for suitably equipped aircraft in weather as 
low as 550 metres visibility and a decision height of not less than 60 metres.) and going up to 
                                                 
17   See Fraport AG (2003c) and ICAO (1993) for details. 
18   See annex 3 for data of more aircraft.  
19   See annex 2 for details.   - 12 -
Cat IIIc that enables zero/zero operations. If an airport does not possess an ILS, the airline has 
to redirect the flight to another airport, causing additional costs for staff and passenger surface 
transportation to the scheduled point of arrival. Not surprisingly there are no airports in 
Germany used for regular scheduled traffic or even holiday charter traffic that are not 
equipped at least with an ILS of Cat. I. 
Airport infrastructure has to meet the demands of an air carrier not only qualitatively but also 
quantitatively. All the different infrastructure components of an airport (runways, apron, 
terminals etc.) have individual capacities. In essence, the capacity of the runway system 
determines overall capacity of the airport in the long run. This is due to the fact that terminals 
and aprons can be enlarged more easily than runway capacity because of less restrict legal and 
administrative barriers and of the possibility to enlarge the capacity in smaller units.
20 If the 
runway is used to its capacity limit, an airline that would like to shift flights to this airport is 
not able to do so because it cannot supersede the incumbent airlines even if it is willing to pay 
higher airport fees. The incumbents can rely on so-called ‘grandfather rights’, which 
guarantee incumbents their take-off and landing rights on the airport.
21 
 
2.3. Legal demands  
An airport has to fulfil numerous legal requirements in order to be able to cater for scheduled 
or leisure traffic: First of all it needs an approval as a public airport or public airfield. Some 
airports in Germany such as Hamburg-Finkenwerder, Lemwerder and Oberpfaffenhofen are 
so-called ‘Werksflughäfen’ (special airfields), not open for general public use and thus not 
suitable for shifting flights to them. In addition, the airport must have the right to enable take-
offs and landings of the aircraft type the airline wants to use. Some smaller airports in 
Germany have legal restrictions concerning the maximum permissible weight (MPW) of 
aircrafts using the runway that are not due to runway length or strength but to environmental 
reasons, protection of nearby residents or ‘reasons of public interest’.
22 Some airfields, for 
example, are restricted to a MPW of 14 t or 20 t although their runway is suitable for heavier 
aircraft as well. Such a restriction leads to a limitation of usable aircraft types to small 
                                                 
20   See Wendlik (1995), p. 5.; Hüschelrath (1998), p. 47; Wolf (2003), p. 65; Urbatzka/Wilken (2003), p. 7. 
21   See e.g. Ewers et al. (2001). 
22    In some federal states ‘Public interest’ is in first place a euphemism for protecting publicly owned 
incumbents from competition of other airports, see e.g. the airport policy in the federal states of 
Brandenburg and Berlin as analysed in Malina (2005), p. 150.   - 13 -
regional aircraft such as DO-328 (<14 t) or ATR 42, ATR 72, CRJ 200 (< 20 t). These 
airports thus cannot be used for holiday charter traffic, for most normal feeder-flights to hubs 
or for point-to-point traffic with dominant aircraft in these segments like Fokker 100, B 737 
and A 320 family or heavier aircraft. 
Apart from weight restrictions authorities sometimes impose limitations on the number of 
aircraft movements, preventing the airport from fully utilizing its technical runway capacity. 
This could lead to the result that flights have to be rejected by an airport although the runway 
still has ample technical capacity. There could also be long curfews, leading to the result that 
the airport is not suitable for intercontinental flights that often start or end early in the 
morning or very late in the evening: There is not a single European airport with a relevant 
number of intercontinental destinations that has a curfew of more than 6 hours. For holiday 
traffic the possibility of nighttime operations is essential because, in contrast to business 
passengers, leisure travellers are willing to accept flights at night. Thus, the airline is able to 
increase the number of aircraft utilisation, thereby raising profitability of operations. Some 
airports are restricted in operations not only at night but also during the day, as the legal 
approval to enable air traffic on its infrastructure might be limited to weekdays or some hours 
throughout the day. These restrictions, in effect, make the airport unsuitable for the type of 
traffic we analyse in this paper. 
All the above mentioned restrictions are based on national law. For some airports, however, 
there are severe limitations of the kind of traffic that can be operated on their infrastructure 
that result from bilateral agreements: Whereas the air transport market within the European 
Union is fully liberalized (each air carrier from any member state is allowed to use every 
airport in the union),
23 traffic to countries outside the EU is subject to agreements of various 
regulatory intensity between the country of origin and the country of destination.
24 
Irrespective of the regulatory intensity all bilaterals contain so-called ‘ownership clauses’, 
which specify that only carriers that are under substantial ownership and effective control of 
shareholders from one of the two contracting countries are allowed to fly routes from one 
country to another.
25 This clause prevents airlines from other EU member states from shifting 
non-EU flights to a German airport and vice versa. This is a problem particularly for 
                                                 
23   See e.g. Sinha (2001), p. 73. 
24   See Jung (1999), p. 33 ff. 
25   See Lelieur (2003) for details.   - 14 -
European network carriers with a high percentage of flights to destinations outside the 
common market such as Lufthansa or Air France/KLM, which are restricted to use airports in 
their home country as hubs. 
 
2.4. Application to the German airport market 
After analysing the customer oriented, infrastructural and legal demands of an airline 
concerning the choice of an airport in general, we now apply the findings to the airport market 
in detail. Our point of view is that of an airline currently using one of the 35 German airports 
with scheduled and holiday charter traffic and looking for a good substitute. In principle, this 
substitute can be situated in Germany or another country. As the new airport has to be 
accepted by the passengers, we only include foreign airports with an access time of less than 2 
hours from the nearest German district. There are over 100 airports within that area with a 
runway of more than 1,000 metres. Only 67 of them, however, are open to public use. 59 of 
these public airports are equipped with an instrument landing system of at least Cat. I. Figure 
2 shows the spatial distribution of the airports. These are the airports for which we assess in 
the following whether they are good substitutes for one of our 35 German airports. 
 
Figure 2: Spatial distribution of German and neighbouring foreign airports open to public traffic with a 
runway of at least 1,000 metres length and ILS 
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First of all we categorize the 35 German airports based on their passenger structure: 
Depending on the importance of low-cost-traffic, traditional leisure traffic and classic feeder 
or point-to-point traffic by full-service-carrier, we divide them into three groups: Low-cost 
airports at which this segment has a market share of at least 40 % (measured in weekly 
departures), holiday airports with the same market share threshold in the holiday traffic 
segment, and standard airports that neither reach such a market share in leisure nor in low-
cost travel.
26 Based on the analysis of airport choice of passengers we assume that passengers 
of a low-cost airport are willing to accept an access time of max 2 hours, passengers of a 
holiday airport 90 minutes and of a standard airport 60 minutes. Using route planning 
software we calculate access time from all German and neighbouring foreign districts to the 
35 examined airports, getting core catchment areas. For each district within the catchment 
area of an airport (we call this airport ‘basis airport’ in the following) we then try to find 
another airport that can be reached within a certain threshold time (= acceptance by 
passengers) and that satisfies the legal, infrastructural and ownership demands of the airline as 
well. The threshold time we use depends on the type of airport we observe (60, 90 or 120 
minutes). The data is again compiled by using a route planning software. The airport which 
fulfils these demands and is accepted by the highest number of inhabitants within the 
catchment area of our basis airport is the best substitute of the basis airport. We calculate for 
this airport/airport combination a substitution coefficient (sA) by dividing the number of 
inhabitants within the catchment area of the basis airport that can reach the substitute within 
the threshold time by the population in this area. As a result we get the share of people in the 
catchment that regard another airport as a good substitute that is perceived as a good 
substitute from the airlines point of view as well. The substitution coefficient is a measure, 
indicating the ability of an airline to switch to another airport without losing its customers or 
having to change their flight operations. Obviously sA-values are between 0 and 1, the higher 
the values, the better the quality of the alternative airport and therefore the higher the 
competitive constraints on the basis airport.  
                                                 
26   We use 40 % as the relevant threshold because both holiday and low-cost traffic is operated using on 
average bigger and heavier aircraft than other types of traffic (e.g. B 737/800 in comparison to Bae 146 or 
CRJ 200). As airports usually impose aircraft fees based on MTOW and, additionally, passenger fees, a 
market share of 40 % share based on the number of flights leads to a share of this segment of overall 
revenues of more than 50 %, which shows that the segment is pivotal for the airport operator. See annex 4 
for details.   - 16 -
We have not yet discussed the process of deciding whether an alternative airport meets the 
infrastructural and legal demands of an airline. The ownership structure has not been 
accounted for so far either. 
Infrastructural requirements are taken into consideration as follows:Infrastructural 
requirements are taken into account as follows: Analysing airport timetable data for all of our 
35 basis airports in summer 2004 we identify the biggest/heaviest aircraft category regularly 
using the infrastructure of one airport. Based on runway strength and runway length we then 
analyse the biggest aircraft category the 59 airports can cater for.
27 We then compare the 
current aircraft usage at the basis airport with the potential aircraft usage at an alternative 
airport. If its airport infrastructure is capable of handling aircraft of at least the category that is 
currently used at the basis airport, this alternative is investigated in greater detail. In this case 
we analyse if this alternative has ample capacity to take up traffic from the basis airport: Most 
of the analysed airports indeed have excess capacity; only Frankfurt/Main, Dusseldorf and 
Berlin-Tegel operate more or less permanently at full capacity.
28 This means that FRA, DUS 
and TXL are only capable of providing services for just a few more flights. DUS for example 
is still able to additionally dispatch the 8 daily flights that used Mönchengladbach (MGL) in 
2004 but not a relevant share of the average 300 daily flights in Cologne. We include the 
capacity situation of these three airports in the analysis by categorizing all airports regarding 
the number of weekly departures and by restricting substitutability of other airports by these 
three to small airports of category 5 and 6 (less than 100 flights per week).
29  
After that we look at the legal demands. Some of these have already been taken into account 
when choosing our 59 potential substitute airports, e.g. the necessity of being an approved 
public airport. What remains is the implementation of curfews and ownership clauses. We 
integrate curfews in the model by requesting that a potential substitute for a basis airport with 
regular flights at night must be open for traffic during the night as well. Ownership clauses 
                                                 
27   See annex 5 for details. 
28   See DFS (2004). FRA is confronted with a demand that exceeds technical capacity throughout the day. In 
DUS, the technical capacity cannot be fully used because of aircraft movement restrictions by local 
authorities. Estimations by DFS (2003), however, show that even if these administrative restrictions were 
lifted, demand would exceed technical capacity in DUS. TXL is different from the other two airports, 
because it is not the runway system that is operating at full capacity but the terminal and apron. As public 
shareholders of Tegel have officially pronounced to increase terminal capacity only marginally due to the 
planned upgrade of Berlin-Schönefeld and closure of TXL in 2010, we have to take terminal and apron 
capacity in TXL as given and not increasable. 
29   See annex 4 for details.   - 17 -
are integrated by eliminating foreign airports from the analysis if the basis airport has a 
significant share (> 20 %) of non EU-flights.  
Finally, the ownership structure between the basis airport and an alternative is taken into 
account. As previously shown, airports with substantial overlap of ownership do not compete 
with each other and thus do not reduce each others market power. Thus we eliminate all 
airports from the analysis that have a similar shareholder structure as the basis airport.  
The following scheme gives an overview about the calculation of the substitution coefficient.   - 18 -
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 AF:  Biggest / heaviest category of aircraft currently using the basis airport 
 BLC:  Importance of the low-cost segment for an airport (≤ 2 means market share higher than 40 %) 
 BU:  Importance of the holiday traffic segment for an airport (≤ 2 means market share higher than 40 %) 
 d:  Access time (in min) 
 dz
Fi
:  Access time (in min) from district z to the basis airport Fi 
 dz
Fj
:  Access time (in min) from district z, from which the passengers can reach the basis airport Fi within the 
threshold time, to an alternative airport Fj. 
 E
Fj
:  Number of inhabitants that can reach alternative airport Fj and basis airport Fi within the threshold time. 
 EGA
Fi
:  Number of inhabitants that can reach alternative airport Fi within the threshold time. 
 EKA
Fi
:   Number of inhabitants that can reach a substitute of the basis airport Fi within the threshold time 
 Ez:  Population of district z 
 Fi: Basis  airport,  {} 1,2,...,35   , = ∈ F F i  
 Fj:  German oder foreign alternative airport,  { } L F j
i ∪ ∈
−  
 FP  Biggest / heaviest aircraft category that can use an airport without relevant weight restrictions  
 Kap:  Capacity utilisation of an airport. (takes the value 1 when operating at full capacity, 0 in case of no 
relevant excess demand) 
 L:  Number of analysed foreign airports,  { } 1,...,20 = L  




:  Comparison of nighttime curfews of airports Fi and Fj. Takes the value 1, if the basis airport has no 
curfew and it is used at nighttime by airlines and the alternative airport Fi has a curfew. Takes the value 
0 in all other cases 
sAi  Substitution coefficient of basis airport i. 
 T:  Assistance set  
 z:  German or foreign district  
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When calculating the substitution coefficient we can divide the airports into four groups. The 
first group shows high values of more than 0.70, which indicates very high competitive 
constraints from other airports and thus low market power. The second group is confronted 
with lower but still significant competition from another airport [0.5 to 0.69]. The third group 
has a substitution coefficient lower than 0.5 but higher than 0.2, the last shows very low 
values, with sA= 0 for 12 airports.  
 
Table 3: Best substitutes and substitution coefficients for 35 German airports 
Basis airport  Best / second best substitute  sA 
Altenburg-Nobitz Leipzig  0.94 
Lübeck-Blankensee   Hamburg  0.93 
Niederrhein   Eindhoven / Dusseldorf   0.96 / 0.93 
Kiel Hamburg  0.79 
Paderborn/Lippstadt   Münster/Osnabrück 0.77 
Mönchengladbach   Cologne/Bonn  0.76 
Münster/Osnabrück   Paderborn  0.76 
Dusseldorf   Cologne/Bonn  0.75 
Friedrichshafen   Zurich  0.68 
Karlsruhe   Frankfurt/Main  0.61 
Frankfurt-Hahn   Zweibrücken / Cologne/Bonn  0.61 / 0.61 
Cologne/Bonn Liege  0.56 
Saarbrücken  Zweibrücken / Luxembourg  0.56 / 0.52 
Augsburg Manching  0.53 
Dortmund   Cologne/Bonn  0.52 
Mannheim Frankfurt  Main  0.43 
Zweibrücken Frankfurt  Main  0.39 
Rostock-Laage   Neubrandenburg  0.11 
Leipzig Berlin-Schönefeld  0.08 
Bremen   Münster Osnabrück  0.07 
Dresden   Altenburg Nobitz  0.03 
Berlin Airport System (TXL, THF; SXF)  -  0.00 
Erfurt -  0.00 
Frankfurt   -  0.00 
Hamburg   -  0.00 
Hanover   -  0.00 
Heringsdorf -  0.00 
Hof-Plauen -  0.00 
Munich   -  0.00 
Neubrandenburg   -  0.00 
Nuremberg   -  0.00 
Stuttgart - 0.00 
Westerland/Sylt -  0.00   - 20 -
3. Intermodal Analysis 
We now take a closer look at the impact of intermodal substitution of airports’ services. 
Competitive constraints could result from passengers switching to other transport modes if an 
airport abuses its market position by increasing prices (leading to higher ticket prices as 
airlines will pass the increase on to its customers) or decreasing quality. The standard 
economic approach for determining the effects of such a conduct is the concept of cross-price 
elasticity. However, there are no studies estimating the cross-price elasticity of demand for 
intermodal substitutes such as road and rail transportation when airport fees change.  
Even the more general question of cross-price elasticity of different transport modes has 
found only scant attention compared to the analysis of own price-elasticities. Most existing 
studies are rather old and analyse much bigger countries than Germany (Canada, USA) in 
which air transportation is much more important due to travel distances, and countries with a 
much weaker road and rail infrastructure (Norway) and thus should not be used for the 
German transport market.
30 
There are, however, some studies for the German transport market based not on price 
elasticities but on a comparison of transport quality (measured in travel time) and transport 
costs.
31 They come to the conclusion that air transport in general underlies strong surface 
competition only in the segment of ultra short haul flights of under 500 km bee-line. Malina 
(2005) sees indications for a smaller competitive segment for business travellers due to their 
high time sensitivity (<300 km) and of a slightly wider one for leisure travellers (< 600 km, 
approx. 60 minutes scheduled flight time).
32  
Table 4 shows the importance of this segment for all 35 German airports analysed. For most 
airports we find a low share of ultra short haul flights. Only Westerland, Augsburg, 
Mannheim, Heringsdorf, Kiel and Hof are dominated by this segment. As we present weekly 
departures with a scheduled flight time of less than 60 minutes, a high share in this segment 
does not necessarily express high intermodal substitution as we have to look at the passenger 
structure as well: If there are mainly business travellers on the airport flying to destinations 
                                                 
30   See Taplin (1980); Oum/Gillen (1982); Andrikopoulos/Terovitis (1983); Fridström/Thune-Larsen (1988) 
and Battersby/Oczkowski (2001). 
31   See Vgl. Haupt/Wilken (1985); Piper (1986); Röpnack (1991); Baum/Weingarten (1992); Giese (1993); 
Weingarten (1995a) and (1995b), Malina (2005), p. 73 ff. 
32   See Malina (2005), p. 75 ff.   - 21 -
less than 600 km but more than 300 km away,  intermodal competition is small; if there are 
mainly leisure travellers,  competition is high. 
 
Table 4: Importance of ultra short haul flights on German airports 
Weekly departures with scheduled 
flight time ≤ 60 min. 
Weekly departures with scheduled 
flight time ≤ 60 min.  Airport 
absolute 




in % of overall 
flights 
Hof-Plauen 15  100.00 Frankfurt   989  22.41
Kiel 27  100.00 Berlin-Tempelhof    45  21.74
Heringsdorf 8  100.00 Dusseldorf    454  21.15
Mannheim 49  90.74 Hamburg   275  19.80
Augsburg 28  87.50 Dortmund 45  15.79
Westerland/Sylt 36  83.72 Niederrhein 19  15.08
Erfurt 44  43.56 Hanover    91  14.33
Dresden   126  38.18 Berlin-Schönefeld   57  13.80
Berlin-Tegel   546  38.10 Stuttgart  147  11.33
Saarbrücken 38  34.86 Karlsruhe    8  10.13
Paderborn/Lipp-
stadt  59 29.65 Neubrandenburg    0  0.00
Bremen   91  28.26 Lübeck-Blankensee  0  0.00
Cologne/Bonn 321  28.13 Mönchengladbach    0  0.00
Nuremberg 123  27.33 Rostock-Laage    0  0.00
Munich 988  25.95 Frankfurt-Hahn    0  0.00
Münster/Osna-
brück   59 24.58 Altenburg-Nobitz    0  0.00
Leipzig 76  23.31 Zweibrücken  0  0.00
Friedrichshafen   14  22.22    
Source: Own calculations based on airport timetables of summer 2004. 
 
Westerland and Heringsdorf are airports in holiday destinations that are used mainly by 
leisure travellers. Although both are islands, they have direct road and rail connections 
through a dam. The combination of very short routes and a high share of leisure travellers 
make these airports highly vulnerable to surface competition. 
Hof-Plauen offers just one route to Frankfurt, operated by a Lufthansa partner and aiming at 
business travellers. Flight distance from Hof to Frankfurt (220 km) is well below the 
threshold of 300 km for business travellers so that Hof-Plauen is also subject to intermodal 
competition. 
Augsburg, Kiel and Mannheim, however, are not constrained by significant intermodal 
competition because they are all mainly used by business travellers flying to Lufthansa’s hubs   - 22 -
or Berlin. All routes on the airports have a length of at least 430 km, what is higher than the 
defined threshold for business travellers. 
 
4. Countervailing power 
So far we have not considered the possibility of countervailing power of airlines that could 
substantially mitigate airport’s market power: An airline could abandon serving the catchment 
area of an airport and could switch to another regional market. Such a threat could impose 
restrictions on pricing even of airports that have been identified as not underlying competitive 
constraints from intramodal or intermodal substitutes. 
The aspect of countervailing power of airlines has so far attracted scant attention. The only 
substantial survey was conducted by the Australian Productivity Commission as part of a 
comprehensive analysis as to whether price regulation of Australian airports should be 
abolished.
33 The commission basically argues that, if an airline is able to threaten 
convincingly with a withdrawal from the airport because this withdrawal has more negative 
effects on financial results for the airport than for the airline, it has countervailing power and 
can force the airport to set more competitive prices. As we cannot directly measure the 
financial impact of a withdrawal directly either due to lack of data or to accountability 
problems, we derive it from the following indicators: 
  Importance of the catchment area for the airlines measured in:  
-  Population: The bigger the population, the higher the importance of the 
catchment area 
-  Gross value added: The higher the gross value added, the higher the 
importance of the catchment area 
-  Number of weekly flights: The higher the number of weekly flights, the higher 
the importance of the catchment area 
-  Airline alliance connection:  
1.  The higher the number of alliances using the airport, the higher the 
importance of the catchment area 
2.  The more alliances using the airport, the higher the revenue impact 
when withdrawing from the airport due to passengers switching to the 
                                                 
33   See Productivity Commission (2002), p. 190 ff.   - 23 -
network of a competing alliance, thus the higher the importance of the 
catchment area 
  Switching Costs due to specific investments: The higher the switching costs, the 
higher the financial impact of switching 
  Market share of the airline at the airport: The higher the market share of an airline, the 
higher the financial impact for the airport if the airline leaves 
  Likelihood of other airlines filling in for switching airlines, measured in: 
-  Population: The bigger the population, the higher the likelihood of other 
airlines filling the gap  
-  Gross value added: The higher the gross value added, the higher the likelihood 
of other airlines filling the gap  
We now take a closer look at all the airports which have been identified as not being subject 
to strong competition from intermodal or intramodal substitutes. All flight data is from 
summer 2004, all other data from 2003 or 2002. 
 
4.1. Airports confronted with strong countervailing power 
We are able to find evidence for high countervailing power at the airports Rostock-Laage, 
Neubrandenburg, Erfurt, Zweibrücken and Mannheim. All five airports are rather small and 
with the exception of Mannheim remote airports with a weakly populated catchment area and 
just a few destinations offered.
34 
Rostock-Laage is mainly used for holiday (charter) traffic by airlines such as Air Berlin, Span 
Air or Air Europa on behalf of just a few tour operators TUI, Thomas Cook etc, for which the 
catchment served by the airport is of minor importance. There is no relevant specific 
investment of the airlines on the airport. The airport operator, on the other hand, strongly 
relies on the flights as most of its revenues (revenues from 15 flights per week with B 737 or 
similar versus 11 remaining flights with Dash 8-100) are produced by them. 
Neubrandenburg is an even smaller airport than Rostock-Laage and served only by two 
airlines, one operating to Varna in Bulgaria on behalf of TUI, alltours and other tour operators 
                                                 
34   Neubrandenburg: Cat. WG 6 with a population within 60 minutes access time of 0.24 M., within 90 minutes 
of 0.75 million.; Rostock-Laage: Cat. WG 5 with a population within 60 minutes access time of 0.53 M., 
within 90 minutes of 1.12 M.; Erfurt: Cat. WG 4 with a population of 1.0 million within 60 minutes, within 
90 minutes of 2.3 million, Zweibrücken, Cat. WG 6 with a population of less than 1.4 million inhabitants 
within 90 minutes. All four catchment areas show a number of inhabitants by far under average.    - 24 -
to Varna in Bulgaria. The other airline is Regio Air / Mecklenburger Flugdienst. Thus, only 
two airlines generate all revenues for the airport. There is no relevant specific investment of 
the two airlines at Neubrandenburg. The catchment area of Neubrandenburg airport is one of 
the least densely populated and underdeveloped areas in Germany with a gross value added 
per capita of just 15,000 EUR a year compared to 22,000 EUR per capita on average in the 
whole of Germany. 
The same holds true for Zweibrücken, which is only used for one holiday charter traffic flight 
per week and is the least frequently used airport surveyed in this study. GVA within 60 
minutes is slightly below average (21,000 EUR), the airport has no connection to one of the 
global airline networks. Moreover and contrary to Neubrandenburg and Rostock-Laage it 
does not show a substitution coefficient near 0 but of a moderate 0.39, further increasing the 
impact of a withdrawal threat of the airline. 
19 airlines operate at Erfurt airport. 30 % of its traffic derives from flights to holiday 
destinations for tour operators, for which the catchment area of Erfurt airport is of minor 
importance due to a very small population. Most flights (approx. 70 %) are to other German 
airports, there is just one daily flight to London. These flights are operated by just three 
airlines: OLT Ostfriesische Lufttransporte, LGW Luftfahrtgesellschaft Walter and Ryanair. 
Ryanair is one of the biggest European airlines serving 87 destinations, using 61 aircraft and 
is known for very price-elastic reactions to change of airport fees and has a proven track 
record of exercising pressure on smaller airports.
35 OLT and LGW are smaller regional 
airlines, specialising in flights between minor airports and connecting them to some major 
German airports as well. However, Erfurt is just a negligible outpost of their network. On the 
other hand the airport operator relies heavily on these three airlines as most revenues are 
generated by their activities on the airport. 
Mannheim is a small airport mainly used for business travel with small aircraft (54 weekly 
departures). Due to its short runway it is not suitable for aircraft bigger than category six.
36 
Although a Lufthansa partner operates on the airport, there are no flights to Lufthansa’s hubs. 
All flights are operated by Cirrus Airlines, thus all flight-related revenue on the airport relies  
                                                 
35    See e.g. negotiations between Ryanair and airports Strasburg, Charleroi, Hahn or Lübeck as shown in 
Gröteke/Kerber (2004) and the following statement by Ryanair CEO, Michael O’Leary, who stated during a 
hearing in the Irish parliament: “We are able to dictate terms to airports ... We move around based on 
whoever comes up with the lowest cost.“ as cited by Parliament of Ireland (2003). 
36   See annex 2.   - 25 -
on just one customer. Cirrus Airlines specialises in short haul point-to-point and feeder traffic 
mainly between German cities. Its main bases are Berlin-Tempelhof, Hamburg and Munich, 
its overhaul station is based in Hamburg. There is no relevant specific investment of Cirrus in 
Mannheim. GVA per capita and the number of inhabitants within 60 minutes access time are 
very high (GVA: 33900 EUR, 6.9 million inhabitants). Like Zweibrücken, Mannheim, 
however, was ranked as one of the airports with a moderate substitution coefficient. Around 
40 % of its regional market can also be served by Frankfurt/Main, 23 % from Karlsruhe and 
20 % from Stuttgart airport which all show similar GVA and population in the catchment 
area.  
 
4.2. Airports not confronted with countervailing power 
A completely different balance of power can be found at the airports Hamburg, Stuttgart, 
Berlin Airport System,  Munich and Frankfurt/Main, where airlines do not possess 
countervailing power: 
Hamburg and Stuttgart serve a catchment area that is very important for many airlines 
operating at the airport because of a very high economic potency.
37 Both airports, the fifth 
(HAM) and seventh (STR) biggest airport in Germany, are mainly used for traditional 
scheduled traffic and show only a small share of holiday flights (18 % in HAM and 32 % in 
STR). They are used by 60 (HAM), resp. 67 (STR) airlines; Lufthansa Group as the most 
important customer of the airports accounts for 50 % (HAM) resp. 40 % (STR) of all weekly 
departures. With several hundred weekly departures they are one of the most important 
spokes of the Lufthansa Network. Both airports are used by competing alliances such as Star 
Alliance (Lufthansa), Oneworld (British Airways) and SkyTeam (Air France / KLM). This 
first of all underlies the quality of the catchment area and, second, prevents Lufthansa from 
convincingly threatening to cancel feeder flights to Munich or Frankfurt, as it would lose 
customers to rivalling alliances which would swiftly fill the gap. 
A similar situation is found at Berlin Airport System: The three airports are used by 85 
different air carriers. Lufthansa Group again has the highest market share of 40 %, including 
alliance partners of 50 % at Tegel airport, which is by far the biggest of the three airports, 
                                                 
37   HAM: 3.6 million inhabitants within 60 minutes, GVA per capita: 23,000 EUR within 60 minutes, in the 
city of Hamburg alone 1.7 Mio. inhabitants with a GVA per capita approx. 37,000 EUR; STR: Population of 
4.7 million with GVA per capita of 29,000 EUR within 60 minute catchment area, in the city of Stuttgart 
alone: 0.6 million inhabitants, GVA per capita of 48,000 EUR.   - 26 -
using the airport for point-to-point and feeder traffic to Munich and Frankfurt. Other network 
carriers such as British Airways, Iberia, Alitalia, Air France / KLM offer several daily flights 
to their hub airports. Berlin with its hinterland has approx. 4 million inhabitants with a 
substandard GVA per capita of ca. 20,000 EUR. However, its role as the German capital leads 
to strong air traffic demand by administrations, associations and media. Moreover, Berlin is 
one of the most important destinations for city-holidays in Europe, generating additional air 
traffic. 
Munich and Frankfurt are by far the most important airports with more than 4400 weekly 
departures to 281 destinations (FRA) resp. 3800 departures to 207 destinations worldwide. 
Both catchment areas are economically very strong, with a large population and high GVA 
per capita.
38 They are used as Lufthansa Group’s main hub, Star Alliance’s market share at 
the two airports is thus very high (70 % in FRA and 60 % in MUC). Both airports are 
connected to competing hubs such as London-Heathrow, Paris Charles de Gaulle, Madrid and 
Rome on a high frequency. Due to the high market share of Star alliance, the revenues of the 
airport operators rely very strongly on the alliance remaining at the airports. If star alliance 
decided to shift its hub operations to another German airport, the airport would lose a high 
percentage of its revenues. Other foreign network airlines would not be able to completely fill 
the gap, as they cannot shift hub operations to FRA or MUC due to legal restrictions already 
discussed in detail above. However, a high dependency of the airport operators on an airline 
group is not sufficient for stating countervailing power. Dependency of the airport is not of 
importance for countervailing power if the airline cannot convincingly threaten to leave the 
airport. Exactly this is the case in Munich and Frankfurt, however: Not only is the catchment 
area very important, switching to another airport would also create high switching costs due 
to specific investments in the flight network and maintenance / overhaul (FRA/MUC) and 
terminal facilities (MUC).
39 Moreover only a few other airports in Germany are capable of 
providing capacity for hub operations, what further mitigates the likelihood of a change of 
hub operations. Lufthansa Group is thus bound to Munich and Frankfurt. 
 
                                                 
38   FRA: 5.2 million inhabitants within 60 minutes access time, GVA per capita: approx. 27,700 EUR, MUC: 
3.1 million inhabitants within 60 minutes, GVA per capita: approx. 28,200 EUR 
39   See Malina (2005), p. 131 ff.   - 27 -
4.3. Airports confronted with modest countervailing power 
We identify modest countervailing power for the remaining airports Hanover, Nuremberg, 
Leipzig, Dresden and Bremen in the sense that some airlines possess countervailing power on 
the airports but others do not. 
The indication for countervailing power in this group is the strongest in Dresden and Leipzig: 
Dresden airport is the fifth smallest of the 18 international airports in Germany, used for 
flights to classical holiday destinations (18 % market share measured in weekly departures) 
and particularly for feeder traffic to Munich and Frankfurt (28 %) and traffic to other 
important German airports. Most scheduled flights are operated by Lufthansa Group or 
partners, Lufthansa’s market share in Dresden is 80 % measured in weekly departures. No 
foreign network carriers use Dresden airport. It has a catchment area of 2 million inhabitants 
within 60 minutes access time, GVA per capita is slightly below average (20,000 EUR). All 
these aspects indicate countervailing power at the airport. However, Lufthansa has 100 
weekly departures to its hubs from Dresden, offering 3,000 to 4,000 seats per week. This 
suggests that Lufthansa is generating substantial profit from these feeder-flights through 
increased load factor of its widebody aircraft on intercontinental routes. 
Leipzig airport is a medium sized airport in eastern Germany (tenth biggest German airport). 
43 % of all aircraft leaving the airport fly to holiday destinations, the rest is mainly feeder 
traffic to Munich and Frankfurt and point-to-point traffic to other main German airports. 
Lufthansa holds a market share of 55 % measured in weekly departures. No airline operating 
from Leipzig generates a significant share of its revenues by using Leipzig. The airport has a 
catchment area of 2 million inhabitants within 60 minutes access time, GVA per capita is 
substandard at 16,000 EUR. Leipzig airport, however, is the only airport for holiday travellers 
that is accessible within 90 minutes driving time, as neighbouring Dresden airport – which 
belongs to the same airport group – concentrates (e.g. due to shorter runway) on traditional 
scheduled traffic. Thus, a potential of 5.2 million people rely on Leipzig airport for their 
holiday flights, this is 8 % of the German population. Whether tour operators are willing to 
relinquish this market is questionable. 
There are strong similarities between flight schedules of Dresden and Bremen airport, the 
sixth smallest international airport in Germany. However, the market share of Lufthansa 
Group, is smaller in Bremen (50 %). Air France / KLM connect Bremen with the SkyTeam 
network. Bremen is home basis of OLT, which operates 124 of its 148 weekly flights from   - 28 -
Bremen and has one of overall two maintenance stations at the airport. Bremen is thus of 
central importance for OLT. Whether the catchment area of the airport is also of significant 
importance for other carriers remains unclear: On the one hand GVA per capita and 
population are slightly below average (1.7 Mio. inhabitants within 60 minutes access time, 
GVA per capita 20,000 EUR), on the other hand 95 flights per week are operated by 
Lufthansa to Munich and Frankfurt; this shows the importance of the airport for network 
revenues. 
Nuremberg is the ninth biggest airport in Germany, providing not only services for holiday 
flights but also feeder flights and point-to-point traffic to various German and some foreign 
airports. Nuremberg is relatively loosely connected to FRA and MUC (42 resp. 21 weekly 
flights); however, this is probably due to the proximity of Nuremberg to both hubs. The 
airport is only used by 11 airlines, the market share of Lufthansa and its partners is 45 %. The 
catchment area is small but shows a GVA per capita slightly above average (24,000 EUR). 
Air France / KLM connect the airport to Amsterdam and Paris. Moreover, the airport is of 
major importance for Air Berlin, which has built its second European hub in Nuremberg and 
has invested specifically in the network configuration. 
Hanover  airport is used for classical point-to-point and feeder traffic and particularly for 
holiday traffic. Market share of holiday traffic is 67 % measured in destinations and more 
than 40 % measured in weekly departures. Because of the high share of leisure travellers and 
their insensitivity to access time, the catchment area is bigger than that of other airports. 
Within 90 minutes it can be reached by 5.8 million inhabitants, the GVA per capita in this 
area is slightly below German average (21,000 EUR). Lufthansa Group connects Hanover 103 
times a week to FRA and MUC. Its market share on the airport is approx. 45 %. Air France / 
KLM, Iberia and British Airways have integrated Hanover into their networks as well. The 
airport is home base to HLX and HLF, carriers dominating the leisure market in Hanover. 
Their parent company TUI has its corporate headquarter in the city. Previous experiences 
show that the importance of TUI for the city and the airport give the company significant 
countervailing power at the airport, which is still mainly publicly owned. TUI was for 
example capable of preventing market entry of low-cost carrier easyjet in Hanover by   - 29 -
threatening to relocate its aircraft to other airports and thus forcing the airport operator to 




This paper is part of an ongoing research project concerned with measuring market power in 
the German airport market. We have calculated a substitution coefficient for 35 German 
airports that indicates the degree of inter-airport competition an individual airport is 
confronted with, complemented by an assessment of intermodal substitutability of airport 
services and countervailing power of airlines. The study gives strong indication that 23 
airports do not possess relevant market power. In contrast to this, four airports (HAM, FRA, 
MUC, STR) and Berlin Airport System are believed to have strong, five (BRE, DRS, LEJ, 
NUE, HAJ) to have modest market power. Competition derives from three different sources: 
There are some airports that are confronted with strong spatial competition from other airports 
(AGB, AOC, CGN, DTM, DUS, FDH, FMO, FNB, KEL, LBC, NRN, PAD, MGL, HHN, 
SCN). There are others that are constrained by substitution from surface transportation (GWT, 
HDF, HOQ). Finally, there are some airports that face significant countervailing power (ERF, 
FKB, RLG, MHG, ZQW). These results provide a basis for the construction of an efficient 
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Annex 1: Aircraft Classification Number of selected aircraft 
ACN 
Flexible surface and subgrade 
strength category … 
Rigid surface and subgrade 
strength category… 
Aircraft Weight 
A B C D A  B  C  D 
MTOW  71 79 99  136 53  61  76  94 
A380-800 
OWE  29 31 35 48 25  26  30  35 
MTOW  62 68 79  107 54  62  74  86 
A340-300 
OWE  37 39 44 57 34  36  42  48 
MTOW  59 66 82  105 54  65  77  88 
B747-400 
OWE  23 24 27 35 20  23  27  31 
MTOW  55 60 70 94 46  54  64  75  A330-300 
OWE  41 44 50 66 36  39  46  54 
MTOW  36 41 51 64 35  42  49  56 
B757-300 
OWE  16 17 20 27 15  17  21  24 
MTOW  39 40 45 51 42  45  48  50  A320-200 
OWE  20 21 22 26 22  23  25  26 
MTOW  33 35 39 43 38  40  42  43  B737-500 
OWE  16 16 18 21 18  19  20  21 
MTOW  22 23 26 29 24  26  27  29  Bae 146-200 
OWE  11 12 13 15 12  13  14  15 
MTOW  18 19 21 24 21  22  23  24  CRJ 700 
OWE  10 10 11 13 11  12  12  13 
MTOW  11 12 14 15 13  14  14  15  ATR 72 
OWE  6 6 7 8 7  7  8  8 
MTOW 9  9  11  12  10  11  11  12  Dash 8-300 
OWE  5 5 6 7 5  6  6  7 
MTOW  12 13 15 16 14  15  15  16 
ERJ-145 
OWE  5 6 6 7 6  7  7  7 
Source: Transport Canada (2001). 
 
Annex 2: Aircraft classification 
Category  Aircraft type (selection) 
1  B 747-400, A 340-600 
2  B 767-300, B 777-300, A 340-300 
3  B 757-300, A 330-300 
4  B 737-800, A 321-200, A 320-200, A 319-200 
5  B 737-500, Fokker 100, A 318-100, CRJ 200/700, ERJ 145 
6  ATR 42-500, ATR 72-500 , Dash 8-400, Bae 146-200, Do 328-110 
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Annex 3: TODR and LDR of selected aircraft 
Dry runway  Wet runway 
15 ° C, sea level  24° C, sea level
22° C, 500 metr. above sea 
level  sea level 
500 metr. above
sea level 
  TODR LDR  TODR  TODR  LDR  LDR  LDR 
B 747-400  3,320 2,130  3,619 4,087 2,379 2,450  2,735
A 340-300  2,765 1,830  3,014 3,404 2,044 2,105 2,350
B 757-300  2,550 1,748  2,780 3,139 1,952 2,010  2,245
B 737-800  2,315 1,600  2,523 2,,850 1,787 1,840  2,055
A 330-300  2,270 1,660  2,474 2,795 1,854 1,909 2,132
A 320-200  2,190 1,440  2,387 2,696 1,608 1,656 1,849
CRJ 700  1,565 1,509  1,706 1,927 1,685 1,735  1,938
ERJ-145 1,550 1,290 1,690 1,908 1,441 1,484  1,657
B 737-500  1,518 1,362  1,655 1,869 1,521 1,566  1,749
ATR 72-500  1,223 1,048  1,333 1,506 1,170 1,205 1,346
ATR 42-500  1,165 1,030  1,270 1,434 1,150 1,185 1,323
Source: Own compilation based on Fraport AG (2003) and aircraft manufacturer data.  
 
Annex 4: Airport Classification concerning traffic structure 
WG:  Overall number of flights 
Cat Thresholds 
1  at least 2,000 flights per week, at least 150 destinations 
2  at least 1,000 flights per week, at least 75 destinations 
3  at least 400 flights per week, at least 50 destinations 
4  at least 100 flights per week, at least 15 destinations 
5  at least 14 flights per week, at least 3 destinations 
6 less 
BU: Importance  of  holiday  traffic on the airport 
Cat Thresholds 
1  at least 60 % share of weekly flights 
2  at least 40 % share of weekly flights 
3  at least 15 % share of weekly flights 
4 less 
BLC:  Importance of low-cost traffic on the airport 
Cat Thresholds 
1  at least 60 % share of weekly flights 
2  at least 40 % share of weekly flights 
3  at least 15 % share of weekly flights 
4 less 
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Annex 5: Current and potential runway usage on German and foreign airports 
Airport AF  FP  Airport  AF  FP 
German airports  PAD 4  4
AGB 6
 a) 6
 a) RLG 4  4
AOC 5  5 SCN  5  5
BRE 4  4 SGE  -  5
BWE -  5 STR  3  2
CGN 3  1 SXF  4  2
DRS 4  4 SZW  -  3
DTM 4
 a) 4
 a) THF 5  5
DUS 3  2 TXL  3  2
ERF 4  4 ZQW  4  3
ETSI -  3 Foreign airports 
FDH 4  4 AMS  -  1
FKB 4  4 BLL  -  2
FMO 4  4 BRU  -  1
FNB 5  4 BSL  -  2
FRAU 1  1 CRL  -  4
GWT 6  5 EIN  -  2
HAJ 3  1 ENS  -  2
HAM 3  1 ETZ  -  4
HDF 6  4 INN  -  5
HHN 4  3 LGG  -  2
HOQ 6  6 LNZ  -  3
KEL 6  6 LUX  -  1
LBC 5  5 MST  -  4
LEJ 3  1 PRG  -  2
MGL 6  6 RTM  -  4
MHG 6  6 SXB  -  4
MUC 1  1 SZG  -  4
NDZ -  4 SZZ  -  4
NRN 4  4 ZRH  -  1
NUE 4  4    
Notes: Only AF-values for basis airports are shown. 
a) Restrictions on maximum permissible tire pressure. 
 